



Global NATO

Overdue or Overstretch?



Brussels, 6 November 2006





GLOBAL NATO

Overdue or Overstretch?

An international conference organised by the Security & Defence Agenda with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and HP, and with the support of NATO, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and AGS Industries.

Monday, 6 November 2006
Bibliothèque Solvay
Brussels

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Rapporteur: John Chapman

Photos: Frédéric Remouchamps, Keops

Design & Production: AOVO Design

Print: Brief-Ink

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INTRODUCTION

The SDA is proud to present this report of the November 6 high-level international conference '**Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch?**' organised with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and Hewlett-Packard, and with the support of NATO, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and AGS Industries.

The conference focused, in advance of the NATO Riga Summit, on the expectations of NATO in terms of partnerships and on policy regarding Afghanistan.

NATO Secretary General **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer** opened the conference by highlighting six priorities: improving capabilities, burden-sharing, coordination with other actors, developing partnerships, enhancing political dialogue and cooperation between NATO and the EU. He concluded there should be no 'beauty contest' between the two institutions and offered Afghanistan, where much of the work is of civilian nature, as an example of where the EU can help.

The Secretary General added that NATO has never been in as much demand as today: it is not a global NATO, but a NATO responding to global threats.


General Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, called for a new 'strategic concept to be defined'. Among other speakers, **Julianne Smith** from CSIS criticised the Riga agenda for being too timid. Questions were also raised on NATO's relationship with not only the EU, but also Russia, China and India. The question was, as the conference suggested, should NATO become 'global' or not?

The SDA is delighted to have co-organised this event with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and we would like to thank all our partners, speakers and participants for making this event a success!



Giles Merritt

Director
Security & Defence Agenda



Peter Weilemann

Director, Brussels Office,
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

The SDA's annual conference - GLOBAL NATO: Overdue or Overstretch? – was held in Brussels at the Bibliothèque Solvay on November 6, 2006. The SDA, together with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Hewlett-Packard organised the event, with the support of NATO, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and AGS Industries.

Security & Defence Agenda Director **Giles Merritt** introduced the conference and NATO Secretary General **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer** delivered the initial keynote address.

Romania's Minister of Foreign Affairs **Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu** delivered a second keynote speech. Three sessions were on the agenda and these were moderated by **Jamie Shea**, Director of Policy and Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO, **Nicole Gnesotto**, Director, EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS) and **Ronald Asmus**, Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center, German Marshall Fund of the US.



Speakers and partners during the lunch

The conference programme

First Session: Where does Europe's security begin and end?

NATO's post-cold war expansion to embrace 10 new members, mostly former Warsaw Pact countries, drew a line under the alliance's original mission. What and where are the present threats to western society, and how do NATO planners believe Europe and its North American allies should respond to them? Aside from the 'arc of instability' along Europe's eastern and southern flank, how far afield do European political leaders believe they should be prepared to go to underpin stability and enhance global security?

Moderator: **Jamie Shea**, Director of Policy and Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO

Keynote Speech by **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer**, NATO Secretary General

Søren Gade, Minister of Defence, Denmark

Gerhard Grasmueck, Director, Hewlett Packard

Ulrich Schlie, Director, Policy Planning and Advisory Staff, Ministry of Defence, Germany

Julianne Smith, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Tomáš Valášek, Acting Director-General of the Defence Policy, International Relations and Legislation Department, Ministry of Defence, Slovakia

Second Session: Are we providing the right instruments?

With 20 countries working increasingly closely with NATO in its “Partnership for Peace” program and on Mediterranean and Gulf cooperation, how would the Asian and Australasian countries, mentioned as possible members of a NATO “Global Partnership”, fit in with these existing relationships? What is likely to be the outcome of the Riga Summit and could global partnerships help NATO better address global challenges like energy infrastructure protection and maritime security? How could NATO further develop its relations with the UN and African Union to give its partnerships and operational engagements greater institutional support worldwide?

Moderator: **Nicole Gnesotto**, Director, EU Institute for Security Studies

Keynote Speech by **Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Romania

Oded Eran, Ambassador, Mission of Israel to the EU and NATO

Karl Viktor Erjavec, Minister of Defence, Slovenia

Karl-Heinz Kamp, Security Policy Coordinator, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)

Julian Lindley-French, Senior Scholar, Centre for Applied Policy, University of Munich



Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister
Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu interviewed by journalists

Third Session: Do Europe and the US see eye-to-eye on NATO's future?

NATO has acquired "boots on the ground" experience in Afghanistan, but what are the lessons still to be learned about combining military and non-military capabilities in NATO expeditionary operations, ranging from nation-building support to combating problems like drug trafficking? Some of NATO's European allies are reticent about the idea of global partnerships extending to East Asia and the Pacific, reportedly on the grounds that these might dilute the transatlantic relationship and devalue Europe's role in the Alliance. But might not a more global role for NATO be to the advantage of the EU's own defence and security initiatives? How far has transatlantic cooperation developed on operational matters and armaments requirements and how strong is the argument that a more global NATO would complement the European defence identity rather than overlap or compete with it?

Moderator: **Ronald Asmus**, Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center, German Marshall Fund of the US

Hartmut Bühl, Communications Team Leader, AGS Industries

Scott Harris, President for Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin

General (ret.) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman, NATO Military Committee & former Chief of Defence, Germany

Edgars Rinkevics, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Latvia

Stuart Seldowitz, Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO

Eckart von Klæden, Speaker for Foreign Policy of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, Bundestag, Germany



Imants Liegis and Robert Bell

Executive Summary

Coordination is the key

Speaking at the SDA's Global NATO conference, the Secretary General **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer** said NATO had never been so much in demand and that the Alliance had to strengthen its key capabilities and adopt a more flexible approach to its partnerships.

In a wide-ranging speech, de Hoop Scheffer insisted that NATO's capabilities had to be improved, burdens shared more equitably and the focus placed on identifying NATO's added-value. Highlighting problems, the Secretary General described current funding of the NATO Response Force (NRF) as "almost a lottery" and some Member States' conditions as "putting caveats on NATO's future". He also wanted an end to the "beauty contest" between the Alliance and the EU. There had to be no duplication of efforts.

"A too timid" approach

During the conference, the current response to meeting today's security challenges - terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, failed states, unresolved conflicts on the EU's borders, threats on cyber-space, organised crime, etc. - was heavily criticised. Denmark's Minister of Defence, **Søren Gade** criticised the

ad-hoc arrangements, the German Ministry of Defence's **Ulrich Schlie** wanted greater cooperation between EU and NATO, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs **Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu** wanted an "ambitious and comprehensive partnership policy", while CSIS' Senior Fellow **Julianne Smith** saw the Riga proposal as being too timid at a time when "bold ideas and rigorous debate" are required.

All or nothing at all

Julian Lindley-French, Senior Scholar at the Centre for Applied Policy of the University of Munich, argued that the world was entering a "grand strategic age". NATO's partners would be as important as its members and anyone not realising the importance of the stakes at risk would be increasingly ignored. **General Klaus Naumann**, former Chairman of NATO Military Committee and German Chief of Defence, called for a new strategic concept to be defined by the Alliance. That had to be backed by political will and, within that "grand strategy", there could be no place for the aforementioned national caveats. It was clear that Germany had changed tack, following its defence White Paper, and that

NATO was now its preferred option for facing security issues. It was also apparent that France was seen to be the problem child with the EU-NATO relationship and that the UK held a similar position within the EU itself. However, **Eckart von Klæden**, Speaker for Foreign Policy of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag, argued that it was not possible to change the situation ahead of the French elections and the planned change of UK leadership.

Defining limits – post Riga

As for NATO itself, it was left to the German Marshall Fund of the US's **Ronald Asmus** to suggest the limits of the global alliance. He suggested we should consider ourselves successful if NATO could operate up to Europe's periphery, in the Middle East (in an arc through North Africa to Afghanistan) and that NATO was unlikely to become the institute of choice when dealing in Asia but that partners from Asia would increasingly be involved in operations in places like the Middle East. As for how partners would be chosen and their respective roles, that was for post-Riga. ■





KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General

With an eye on the conference title - *Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch* – the Secretary General initially focused on two words – *global* and *overstretch*. In regard to the first, de Hoop Scheffer saw no need for global NATO. Instead, there had to be an Alliance that defended its members against global threats: such as terrorism, the spread of WMDs and failed states. NATO had to take its place in a holistic approach to security, where the Alliance was one of many organisations, each playing their respective role.

As for NATO being overstretched, de Hoop Scheffer said that he had never seen NATO's resources so much in demand with more than 50,000 soldiers serving in operations and missions on three continents. The Secretary General saw these demands increasing and he had a six-point plan to ensure that the Alliance could achieve results:

1) Increased capabilities: the Riga Summit¹ draws together the work on missile defence, air-to-ground surveillance, terrorism-related work, and defence against WMDs. In addition, the NATO Response Force (NRF) would be declared fully operational. The Secretary General saw Riga as a stepping-stone, with more work to be done, especially

in the area of defence planning. He expected the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG)² which would be published at Riga, to set out the capabilities needed to tackle the 21st century challenges. Planning had to be capabilities-based, more tailored to the specific niche capabilities of individual allies and, above all, more flexible.

2) More equitable burden sharing. Starting with the burden of responsibility, de Hoop

Scheffer criticised the national caveats that limited the use of forces and the commanders' flexibility. With the need to cover the full spectrum of operations, from combat to peacekeeping, he argued that Member States were "putting caveats on NATO's future." However, there was also the burden of funding. Taking the NRF as an example, the Secretary General saw

little logic in only those nations involved at the time of the NRF's deployment having to pay, it was more of a "lottery" than a funding arrangement for an Alliance built on solidarity. He was therefore recommending an extension of the trial period for common funding of short-term NRF deployments, particularly the strategic airlift element. This would enhance the

"We do not need a global NATO; We need partners who are willing to engage in meeting today's security challenges"

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer



NRF's credibility, give it the catalyst role that was required and remove national alibis for not committing focus to it.

3) Coordination with other bodies. The Secretary General had drawn a fundamental conclusion from NATO's involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan; there had to be closer cooperation with other international organisations – between those who provide security and those who provide development. That meant greater coordination with the UN, the EU, and NGOs – at both the theatre and strategic levels. Where a window of opportunity

for development existed, it had to be fully exploited. The Secretary General argued that NATO was a provider of security first and foremost and that in places like Afghanistan, where the final solution had to be reconstruction and development, coordination with other organisations was essential. He emphasised that this approach would not be coordinating other organisations, but working with them.

4) Partnership development. As his fourth point, de Hoop Scheffer called for more intensified cooperation with the Alliance's partners. He had several proposals:

a. Making the Partnership for Peace (PfP) tool more readily available to the partners - for instance, in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

b. Exploiting NATO's expertise in training other countries' security forces, notably in the Middle East.

c. Deepening ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region; no one was suggesting extending NATO's membership to Asia, but the Secretary General wanted to engage with other countries, regardless of geography. He wanted a functional approach to security, one that retained NATO's core functionality - "the Washington Treaty, Article 5³, collective defence and security".

5) Enhanced political dialogue.

Seeing the need for a package that went further than simply capabilities, de Hoop Scheffer looked to Afghanistan, where there had to be reconstruction and development, counter-narcotics policies and democracy-building. Such a holistic view required an intensive dialogue, as to what NATO should and should not be doing. Taking energy security as an example, the Secretary General felt NATO had a role to play but there should be a debate on where it could bring added-value.

6) Progress in the NATO-EU relationship.

The Secretary General was not impressed by the situation between NATO and the EU, it was suffering from "understretch rather than overstretch." There had to be a sustained dialogue on: a) harmonising

military transformation, notably the NRF and the EU Battle Groups, and b) ensuring the smooth cooperation between NATO and the EU in Kosovo. Duplication of efforts (between the organisations) had to stop - they were "in the business of security, not engaged in a beauty contest."

Q&A with the Secretary General

CPG or a new strategy for NATO?

The Atlantic Council of the United States' **Frances G. Burwell**, Director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations, had heard the Secretary General's plans (Riga and post-Riga). Given the extensive scope, Burwell asked if there was any thought of a Wise Person's Council or a review of NATO's strategic concept. The Secretary General preferred to work within the boundaries of the CPG, to be published at Riga, but nonetheless expected a discussion on the future Strategic Concept of NATO in capitals after Riga with a view to the next NATO Summits, probably in 2008 and 2009.

After Defense News' Correspondent **Brooks Tigner** asked how the CPG might change the way in which defence planning was performed, de Hoop Scheffer noted that all aspects of planning had to be reviewed. There were still "too many traces of the Cold War" at NATO HQ and timeframes between planning and missions were too long. Reform was the name of the game.

Russia

The WEU's Assistant Secretary to the Defence Committee **Paulo Brito** was more concerned

about Russia and its re-emergence on the world stage. Could the Secretary General offer his view on Russia's attitude towards NATO and was the Alliance doing enough in areas such as energy security? In response, de Hoop Scheffer said the Russia-NATO partnership was important and that it was "reasonably healthy". Both sides did not always agree and on subjects such as further NATO enlargement, the Secretary General said the driving force would always be the wishes of the Ukrainian and Georgian people as well as NATO's own decision-making. NATO's enlargement had brought peace and stability to Europe and the Alliance had to continue to support its core values.

Funding

Noting the Secretary General's efforts to reform NATO's funding, SDA Director **Giles Merritt** asked if those efforts should be in parallel with the EU's discussion about defence budgets or whether they were the same topic to be discussed together.

Even though he acknowledged that there was only one set of forces (with increased competition for their availability), the Secretary General reasoned it was too complex to attempt to link the NATO and EU discussions. He supported the EU having its own identity as long as efforts were complementary and duplication was avoided. Adding a dose of realism, de Hoop Scheffer said that common funding (for NATO) would not be a panacea, as someone would still have to provide the funding.

"The way in which the NATO Response Force is funded is almost a lottery"
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

EU-NATO cooperation

Given that the Secretary General saw evidence of duplication, the EU Observer's **Mark Beunderman** wanted to know where the EU should be doing more and where it should be doing less. Latvia's Ambassador to the EU **Imants Liegis** asked if the Secretary General could see scope for more EU-NATO cooperation in, for example, Afghanistan.

First and foremost, the Secretary General wanted dialogue. There had been unnecessary duplication as to who should provide

airlift for African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, but dialogue was needed to avoid such incidents. Agreeing that NATO was in the civil-military business in Afghanistan, via the provincial reconstruction teams, de Hoop Scheffer repeated that NATO could not do everything and

the EU should be taking on policing roles, doing more in training and getting involved in development and reconstruction. A close and cooperative dialogue would lead to NATO having an effective "exit strategy."

This was equally true of future NATO and EU cooperation in Kosovo. The Secretary General believed close EU-NATO cooperation was also essential after the definition of status. There had to be inventive solutions found in order to cement and strengthen the key relationship between the two organisations. ■

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Session 1

Where does Europe's security begin and end?

Moderating the opening session, **Jamie Shea**, NATO's Director of Policy and Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General, looked ahead to the main topics on the debating table. Having heard the Secretary General's remarks, he had four Alliance-related questions for the panellists to tackle:

- 1) Objectives: is NATO taking on the main challenges faced by its Member States?
- 2) Ambitions: does the Alliance need to enlarge its scope?
- 3) Tools for the job: does NATO have the right instruments to be successful?
- 4) Togetherness: are the transatlantic partners reaching a consensus on how the issues need to be tackled together?

Denmark's Minister of Defence **Søren Gade** gave his full support to the Secretary General's words and called for stronger and closer partnerships between NATO and other organisations. He wanted to see the Riga Summit deliver a clear message on that subject with approval of the Concerted Planning and Action (CPA) initiative.



Seeing NATO as a main contributor to Denmark's peace and security, Minister Gade reasoned that the Alliance could do more to further its political dialogue. It could discuss common problems, even ones not in NATO's arena such as Iran, the Middle East and North Korea. The Minister could see no clearly defined end to NATO's transformation. The process had to continue. Minister Gade saw going

global in the same way as the Secretary General; That meant increased coordination with Australia, New Zealand and Japan, as well as stronger relationships with the UN, the EU, the African Union, the OSCE and NGOs in general.

“Coordination is too ad-hoc; it must be more structured to solve today's conflicts.”

Søren Gade

Gade criticised today's ad-hoc situation; a more structured approach was required. Afghanistan was a striking example as the international actors had to work together. Duplication had to be avoided and coordination had to be improved – that was the reasoning behind the Danish CPA initiative. The Minister saw such action as being crucial to future peace and security. With the 16,000 troops in Kosovo being responsible for 10% of the GNP, the need for planning was striking.

Hewlett-Packard Director **Gerhard Grasmueck** wanted to talk business, as he believed that HP's new concept – with its massive parallel processing – could be the right answer to meet NATO's requirements for reform.

Grasmueck outlined HP's commitment to work with NATO in the defence area. Looking to the challenges faced by HP, he explained that the company had undertaken the largest merger in the IT industry (combining DEC, Compaq and the old HP) and emerged well-positioned for the future. However, HP still had too many different order processing mechanisms and various regional systems. This had led HP to develop a new global architecture. With the company's supply chain being vital, Grasmueck stated that data consistency was key; the solution was the creation of a data warehouse ("one single data store") that could handle close to 1,000 terabytes⁴. He reasoned that NATO would have to manage a similar

"HP has a new concept – massive parallel processing – that could be the right answer to solve NATO's information sharing problems."

Gerhard Grasmueck



amount of data. HP had developed a new concept based on massive parallel processing and this was available today.

German Ministry of Defence's Director for Policy Planning and Advisory Staff, **Ulrich Schlie**, also wanted closer cooperation between major players but he saw the need for more "European homework". Schlie described a world where no single country could face today's security challenges, as threats were emerging from all points on the globe. Terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, failed states, unresolved conflicts on the EU's borders, threats from cyber-space, organised crime – all of these were part of the security picture. That had been described recently in the German government's White Paper on Defence and Security. Schlie therefore focused on the conclusions to be drawn:



- Only a strong EU could work effectively in partnership with a strong US; military power was not enough and a change in mindset was required
- European security issues had to be defined in order to develop a common analysis of problems faced by the EU
- NATO had a major role to play and it had to be part of a comprehensive approach to security – involving political, diplomatic, civil and economic tools

Schlie wanted more effective cooperation between NATO, the EU, the UN and NGOs – there had to be a mechanism that guaranteed more efficiency, greater complementarity of these organisations and avoided duplication.

“Most of the Riga initiatives are too timid, at a time when the Alliance needs bold ideas and rigorous debate.”

Julianne Smith



Julianne Smith, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stated that the Riga Summit would exhibit some of NATO's current schizophrenia on its overarching purpose. Should NATO focus exclusively on collective defense (Article V missions) or will Afghanistan serve as the precedent for a global NATO? Smith argued that the Riga Summit would highlight NATO's ongoing dilemma.

Looking at a few of the Summit initiatives, Smith gave her views as to how they would play at Riga:

- 1) **Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG):** this offers “something for everyone”; for traditionalists it stressed collective defence, while for globalists (including Washington), the CPG urges NATO to prepare for a wide-range of missions. Although Smith felt that the CPG



Speakers and participants during the coffee break



did not get to the heart of the matter, she argued that together with the guidance that came out of the recent Defence Ministerial in June 2006, the balance had shifted in favour of a more ambitious role for NATO.

- 2) Enlargement:** Here, Smith saw two camps – sceptics who were experiencing “enlargement fatigue” and those who herald enlargement’s benefits via contributions from countries such as Poland. In the short-term, she saw the sceptics prevailing (in Riga), whereas the proponents of enlargement would prevail in the long haul (with countries like Albania, Croatia and Macedonia likely joining the Alliance in 2008).
- 3) Partnerships:** Citing another case of division, Smith described those who wanted Australia, Japan and others to be rewarded for their contributions to NATO missions through a formal partnership programme at NATO. Others, however, argue that doing so would take NATO into new political roles that would detract from NATO’s core purpose. Riga will likely produce a compromise on this issue. No cumbersome structures will be created but some joint training programmes with these countries might be developed.
- 4) Training:** The United States, Italy, and Norway have proposed that the Alliance create a training center in the Middle East. While most NATO countries recognise NATO’s longstanding and valuable experience in training over the years, several members question

“There is more capability to be unlocked in Eastern Europe.”
Tomáš Valášek



Tomáš Valášek

whether or not this is part of NATO’s core mission. As a result, the Alliance will likely task the North Atlantic Council to investigate this idea. On training⁵, Smith foresaw a discussion as to how it would be funded and if it was really part of NATO’s mission – the result would be a decision to look at the situation.

- 5) Stabilisation and reconstruction:** Similarly, the Alliance will likely task itself to look into various proposals to strengthen its stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities.

Overall, Smith saw Riga delivering some “timid proposals” at a time when “bold ideas and rigorous debate” were needed. In the long-term she hoped the Alliance would commit itself to rewriting NATO’s Strategic Concept, a “difficult and painful” task to be sure. If it did not, Smith argued that NATO could be caught in a cycle of “ambiguity and stagnation”. She concluded that NATO could and should do better.

The Slovakian Ministry of Defence's Acting Director-General of the Defence Policy, International Relations and Legislation Department, **Tomáš Valášek**, had noticed an air of gloom, in some quarters, with the Riga agenda being described as too broad and too practical. He didn't agree, as this was the real world – it was “time to get down to business.”

Collective action against terrorism was always going to be difficult, especially when there were no clear answers on the right strategies to be employed. Overall, Valášek saw a healthy atmosphere surrounding the Alliance - it was an organisation deep into transformation – and that vital task was not sexy. He added that Riga was a transformation summit, and reminded the Alliance that there was more capability to be unlocked in Eastern Europe. Describing those countries as the “not so new Member States”, Valášek made a plea for them to be more involved in the military transformation. The political dimension had succeeded, with countries like Slovakia being transformed from security consumers to security producers, but there had been too little emphasis on the generation of new capabilities in the region.

Valášek called for sustained assistance from NATO HQ and the older allies, so that the countries of Eastern Europe would have more ability to aid the Alliance. That meant building civilian expertise and that implied the identification and training of people who could think globally and pragmatically.

The first session debate

Transformation – half-full or half-empty glass?

The former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee & Germany's former Chief of Defence, **General Klaus Naumann**, did not agree that everything in the transformation garden was rosy. He saw the CPG as a compromise rather than a silver bullet. Member States were not investing enough and Naumann asked what the Riga Summit would do to address the problem.

Gade denied that he had said everything was fine, but the Alliance glass was only half-full. For example, in Afghanistan, it was immoral to ignore the post-military situation. NATO had to ensure long-term stability and that implied well-planned coordination with other bodies. So in Kosovo, coordination between NATO, the EU and the UN for example, should be taking place now. Gade argued that the EU taxpayers expected international organisations to do better.

NATO enlargement

Albania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for NATO Department **Agim Fagu** referred to Smith's comments on sceptics and optimists and proposed Croatia and Albania as future security providers rather than consumers. Smith said she was a proponent of NATO's recent enlargement. She felt that unrealistic demands were being placed by the sceptics on the new Member States. Some were struggling to modernise as well as help in missions. Smith also noted that most of the decision-making was still in the realm of the old members. ■

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu,

Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister

Ungureanu initially looked back at the partnerships of the nineties and described them as a necessity for overcoming divisions and fostering stability in NATO's neighbourhood. Even now, the PfP remained the Alliance's closest link with the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region and Asia. However, in a world with a "more complicated and unpredictable international context", Ungureanu argued that security in Europe was far from being "a finished job" and that EU and NATO boots were needed on the ground.

He wanted the truth to be faced, that democracy, reforms and stability were not irreversible in Eastern Europe. NATO could not act alone and it had to make a concerted effort to work with the countries of the region and with the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Outside the borders of Europe, NATO had to be pro-active. In fact, Ungureanu argued that the Alliance's operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Darfur had led to interaction with international organisations and to NATO becoming an agent for change in the international security environment.

That was the right course of action, as NATO should not develop a doctrine of global intervention; the global partnership initiative should be seen as a visionary and evolutionary step for the Alliance to interact with the world without changing its core mission. Ungureanu



did not want NATO's global partnerships to be:

- A step towards a global NATO
- A new security organisation competing with the EU and UN
- An organisational structure aimed at containing other nations
- A platform for NATO to be involved in every world crisis

As it reached out to global partners, NATO had to deepen its relationships with the countries in the Alliance's neighbourhood. The global partnership had to provide a more rigorous and systematic framework for NATO's interaction with other organisations in order to foster peace and stability. Partners could be chosen based on common values, capabilities and on the desire to foster Euro-Atlantic and international security.

Ungureanu saw the benefit of having a more structured approach with Australia and New Zealand. In addition, to building international confidence in NATO, a special approach was required with Russia and political engagement was required with China and India. All of these actions would lead to NATO's global partnership, one that would have objectives such as:

- Anchoring the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe in the Euro-Atlantic community
- Upholding NATO's operational commitments
- Supporting NATO's crisis prevention capabilities and the fight against terrorism
- Strengthening NATO's capability to contribute to international stability

Ungureanu described this as an "ambitious programme" to be approached cautiously. The PfP was the basic building block and progress had to follow a step-by-step approach. The first step should focus on security developments in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. Dialogue

"NATO must be proactive outside the borders of Europe."

Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu

with the Republic of Moldova and Georgia was essential, with the aim of developing a comprehensive security picture of the region within NATO.

The chosen partners should be able and willing to face the global challenges, including issue-based cooperation on energy security, maritime security and post-conflict reconstruction. This would be linked to cooperation with the UN and other regional organisations and engagement with NGOs. The Minister acknowledged that peacekeeping would be difficult, and he suggested that a mechanism to allow NATO access to external funds should be investigated. Proper cooperation with the EU would facilitate the use of resources.

In conclusion, Ungureanu said the global partnership was certainly not overdue, but it was timely. He wanted Riga to set the foundation for a more ambitious and comprehensive policy on partnership. NATO's image as a "Cold War warrior"

had to be replaced by that of a contributor to international stability. It was more of an opportunity than a risk. ■



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“The international work of the political foundations is valuable for our country, as it contributes significantly to gain insights into foreign countries and cultures and to complete and enrich the image which diplomats and trade delegations transport. In fact, the political foundations abroad have another access and not rarely a more direct access to the local people than diplomatic missions ever could have. (...) The political foundations not only contribute to learning processes abroad; but they also make the people learn – learn about the values and principles, which our community in Germany is based upon, and learn about our beliefs for which we Germans stand.”

Federal President HORST KÖHLER

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is related to the Christian Democratic movement and is guided by the same principles that inspired Adenauer's work. The KAS offers political education, conducts scientific fact-finding research for political projects, grants scholarships to gifted individuals, researches the history of Christian Democracy, and supports and encourages European unification, transatlantic relations, international understanding, and development-policy cooperation.

The international work is of outstanding importance for the KAS. With its international commitment the KAS promotes political, economic and social systems based on the model of liberal democracy and social free market economy and strengthens Christian Democratic Policy in a global scale. Moreover, it makes a contribution to represent German interests abroad.

In the field of development cooperation the KAS is committed to fostering democracy and the rule of law, to implementing social and market-economic structures as well as to promoting human rights. Currently, the KAS hosts more than 200 projects in around 100 countries on four continents with 67 field offices.

The work in Western Europe and the USA gives priority to deepening the transatlantic partnership and European Integration.

The Brussels' Office has become a third “pillar” of the Stiftung. It was opened in 1978 and has since then been extended continuously. The traditional focus on European Integration as well as issues on foreign and security policy and economic issues was subsequently complemented by the establishment of the “Dialogue Development Policy Project”. It also takes care of the bilateral relations with the BeNeLux-countries.

Session 2

Are we providing the right instruments?

EU-ISS Director, **Nicole Gnesotto**, moderated the second session and gave her points for and against NATO adopting a more global approach. (see box below)

Gnesotto handed the floor over to Slovenia's Minister of Defence, **Karl Viktor Erjavec**, who gave Slovenia's view on NATO's partnerships. Erjavec welcomed the Alliance's moves beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, adding that they were now better understood. With NATO's 60th birthday approaching, Erjavec foresaw that the results of transformation would be plain to see at that time. In his mind, the renewal of partnerships went hand-in-hand with transformation. Some associations might not fit the new 21st century environment. In one sense, Erjavec reasoned, NATO would get the partners it deserved.



He looked ahead to a global NATO, one not based on geography, but one that united partners with shared values. The Alliance needed

Against a global approach

- *Reduced security:* EU-US links should be placed first, expansion dilutes the transatlantic links
- *Military aspects:* the Alliance would be too stretched
- *Political reasoning:* in a complex world, democracies vs. the rest of the world brings the wrong message

In favour of a global approach

- *Improved security:* many countries already working with NATO
- *Logistical reasons:* NATO needs troops with the EU and US already busy elsewhere
- *Political reasoning:* it would help to create an alliance of democracies



Viktor Erjavec

all kinds of partners, including the African Union (AU) and Human Rights Watch, and they had to be willing to work in crisis areas. Erjavec saw a change in the current thinking. With the PFP, the initiative had been with the partners but now, with talk of global partnership, it was NATO in the driving seat.

Israel's Ambassador to the EU and NATO, **Oded Eran**, argued that the Alliance was suffering from a lack of direction. It had decided to take on the new challenges of the 21st century, but there had been no decisions as to how this would be done. Therefore, potential partners – who could make a contribution - could not engage with the Alliance.

Looking for solutions, Eran reasoned that global membership would bring problems (the question of which nations would qualify) and it would be difficult to identify global security



Oded Eran

providers. In his own area, he saw reluctance for the Israeli Army to serve outside of its own country – in this he likened it to many of the NATO forces – and while the Mediterranean Dialogue was a forum for security-related issues, it was not the complete answer.

Eran concluded that the onus was on NATO to demonstrate the benefits for other countries to become Alliance partners. He suggested that new thinking was required and recommended that a new model for partnership be developed for non-NATO, non-European members.

“NATO cannot engage with potential partners, as there is no clear direction as to how it would work with third countries.”

Oded Eran

The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung's (KAS) Security Policy Coordinator, **Karl-Heinz Kamp**, looked in depth at NATO's various partnerships and acknowledged that they had been vital in transforming the Eastern European landscape. However, he had seen the creation of



Karl-Heinz Kamp

a veritable partnership industry – the PfP itself, the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) to name but a few. Many of these had arisen due to enlargement, and Kamp argued for a reform of the partnership industry.

Now that NATO was a global security provider, its success would be measured not just in terms of European political transformation, but more in the Alliance's achievements outside of Europe. There, he was hopeful for new alignments with like-minded countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Argentina and Brazil. That implied that these countries should have a voice at the table, perhaps not with the right of veto but they should be able to express their views and report back to their governments.

Although he wanted to avoid a “partnership of the rich”, Kamp felt that some criticisms of the global

“Global partnership is not a prelude to global membership.”

Karl-Heinz Kamp



Julian Lindley-French

partnership programme were not justified:

- It would not be a “global cop”; it needed a go-ahead from 26 Member States
- It was not the prelude to “global membership” as there was no inclination to change article 10⁶
- It was demand-driven by countries such as Australia, Japan and Finland

Julian Lindley-French, Senior Scholar at the Centre for Applied Policy of the University of Munich, argued that we were seeing the start of a “grand strategic age”. Stability was the goal and he wanted to know if the world was capable of meeting the global challenges (e.g. provision of raw materials, energy, etc.). Lindley-French reasoned that this situation called for better organisation of all the actors and an extension of a doctrine based on the

need for an enhanced strategic defence hub. However, he argued that many Member States were not ready for this grand strategic age and that hopes of stability were currently with the US and its allies.

With Australia requesting that it become a NATO partner, the Alliance was becoming a “strategic enabler.” It was a focal point, not for a global alliance, but for an alliance across the globe. Membership of this new alliance would be subject to performance, but the US was seen to be very much the leader. Partners would have as much influence as members, and the name of the game was achievement. The age of enlargement was over; the age of enhancement was beginning.

The second session Q&A

Ask not what you can do for NATO; ask what NATO can do for you?

The Australian Embassy’s Counsellor **Peter Sawczak** wanted flexibility. Australia saw the need for a functional approach to security, rather than a geographic one. It had seen potential problems but it lacked like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Observing that the man on the street was perhaps unsure of NATO’s *raison-d’être*, Sawczak wanted to know what it could do for its partners and to what extent NATO saw threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Describing Australia as a “capable partner”, Sawczak reasoned that it was therefore up to NATO to be creative.

Eran agreed with Sawczak, as NATO had a public relations deficit in the Middle East as well as in Australia. There was a lack of knowledge



about its role on the world stage. That had to be increased before the Alliance attempted to increase its engagement with other countries.

An increased role for the UN

Pakistan Ambassador to the EU **Saeed Khalid** wanted to discuss responsibilities. Noting that the presence of foreign forces in a country was an extremely delicate matter, the Ambassador said he was nervous of NATO troops entering countries in its potential new role. Positioning the Alliance as an organisation for collective defence, Ambassador Khalid had concerns about its new role in opposing asymmetric terrorism.

For the Ambassador, the UN was the natural organisation for global defence as it was the world’s only benign force. He concluded that any non-UN force was not benign. Ambassador Khalid suggested that a preferred exit strategy for NATO would be for its troops to be replaced by UN (peacekeepers). In that regard, the Ambassador asked if NATO was now a global peacemaker rather than a military alliance. Pointedly, the Ambassador mentioned that the

Secretary General had not mentioned the UN, but had spoken of a role for NGOs.

Thales' Senior Vice President for EU, NATO and European Cooperation **Edgar Buckley** responded that NATO could be a peacekeeper. Kamp answered that NATO's policy was to defend itself but that this had to happen beyond its borders. That was the logic in the shift from geographic to functional security. Lindley-French had no problem with the UN being involved in the issues under discussion, as long as it was effective.

Eran accepted the sensitivity involved, mentioned by the Pakistan Ambassador, when troops entered another country. However, he saw that the situation was the same in the Gulf countries as in the countries of the Mediterranean.

The Black Sea region

The Turkish Delegation to NATO's First Secretary **Cenk Uraz** asked for Ungureanu's vision on the security challenges in the Black Sea region and how useful did he see "local ownership" in meeting those challenges.

Ungureanu responded that he was referring to "frozen conflicts", where the countries involved offered threats to the EU and NATO. He also saw a "cooperative deficit" in the Black Sea region, as heads of state had only been able to meet on five occasions in the last 10 years. Expanding, Ungureanu argued that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)⁷ was riddled with problems. Projects remained unfinished and due to the "fetish of local ownership", Operation Active Endeavour had not reached the Black Sea. Seeing a region beset with illegal trafficking,

the Minister placed the Black Sea region firmly at the top-end of the EU's ESDP priorities.

Israel's links with NATO

With Israel having signed an Individual Cooperation Program (ICP)⁸ with NATO, Uraz wanted to know what were the incentives for other Mediterranean Dialogue countries to have similar arrangements with the Alliance.

In regard to other Mediterranean countries following Israel's lead in gaining ICP status, Eran said that this should strictly be approached on a country-by-country basis. The links had to be tailor-made for individual countries, and NATO should not attempt to have a partnership with the region as a whole.

NATO and the Middle East crisis

Edgar Buckley asked if Israel saw a role for NATO in solving the Middle East situation. Eran had been disappointed not to see NATO involved in the Lebanon crisis and he did see a role for the Alliance. However, there had to be a mandate and request from both sides.

Global partnerships

EU-ISS Fellow **Marcin Zaborowski** asked how NATO would react to any incidents involving North Korea, if Japan was a partner of the Alliance. Kamp did not see this as Japan using article 5 through the back door, but if North Korea did attack Japan, then NATO would get involved as that would be a strategic issue. In that respect, the differences between membership and non-membership were wafer-thin.

Eran argued that Article 10 had been overtaken by the new agenda, while Article 5 would allow for different kinds of membership. ■



Q&A session

Session 3

Do Europe and the US see eye-to-eye on NATO's future?

AGS Industries' Communications Team Leader, **Hartmut Bühl**, opened the final session. He accepted that NATO had a global responsibility, even if its limits were not clearly defined. This led Bühl to see both NATO and the EU having problems in all fields of endeavour – soldiers, equipment etc. Those organisations would need US support until Europe had more trained soldiers and respective material available.


However, with NATO acting globally, it would emphasise the need for effective strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling capability. For Bühl, that was not a problem as airlift capabilities could be bought on the open market. Where he did highlight a gap was in continuous 24-hour reconnaissance and surveillance of the terrain which was not available on the market.

Referring to the Secretary General's comments about caveats, Bühl argued that in the future, nations would not allow their troops to be deployed without proper reconnaissance and surveillance from the sky. He reminded the audience that NATO had opted for a reconnaissance and surveillance system back in 1992! Industries only now got the chance to propose a system compliant to the requirements of NATO. The 15-year gap might seem to be long, but Bühl argued this was reality – nations were involved and consensus had to be reached. Where he did have a



problem was with those nations who were even now trying to delay the project in order to spend money elsewhere.

If NATO was to improve its independence in crisis management – together with the EU through the Berlin Plus agreement - the proposed Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system⁹ had to go forward. NATO's crisis management responsibilities meant that everyone had to be aware of the situation on the ground during 24h and in all weathers – in humanitarian missions, in conflict situations and at borders. Rapid reaction had to be guaranteed in all of these situations and that meant accurate reconnaissance and surveillance to save lives.



Gen. Klaus Naumann

General Klaus Naumann restricted himself to five points:

- 1) **There had been a convergence of views:** Naumann saw the US and Europe's views on NATO's future converging in the post-Iraq era; the US was returning to the idea of alliances and the advantages of the transatlantic alliance were gaining ground over the idea of Europe being a counterweight to the US.
- 2) **NATO was seen as a political body:** Europe was acknowledging that NATO was more than simply a military organisation and that it also had political weight. Europe also understood that NATO was the only legally-binding institution that brought Europe and the US together and that the two sides had to work jointly.
- 3) **Joint decision-making was essential:** That implied that the US

“National caveats cannot be reconciled with solidarity and risk-sharing.”

General Klaus Naumann

had to understand the need for decision-making after consultation. On the other side, Europe had to acquire capabilities to match its ambitions – with both sides needing to have all the necessary tools in the toolbox. Military campaigns could never be enough.

4) Neither side could meet today's

challenges: Both the US and Europe had to think globally and act together. This implies that several actions had to be taken:

- a. Both sides must acquire a wider set of tools (including coordinated civil-military operations)
- b. EU-NATO cooperation must be enhanced
- c. The EU had to be prepared to offer non-military assets to NATO
- d. The non-US military forces must be transformed so they can take part in network-enabled operations (thereby taking advantage of information-sharing techniques). Naumann added that the AGS project was more important than transport aircraft and that NATO would be making a mistake if it gave priority to the latter.

5) A grand strategy was required. In

conclusion, Naumann argued for a new strategic concept to be developed – called the “Grand Strategy”. It had to be backed by political will and the resolve to meet 21st century challenges. He added that NATO's

nations had to see ongoing operations through to the end and that national caveats could not be reconciled with the concepts of solidarity and risk-sharing.


Providing another industry perspective, Lockheed Martin's President for Continental Europe, **Scott Harris**, described industry as a capabilities provider that could transpose requirements into finished products and services. He highlighted two areas where industry can play a major role:

- *The acquisition, interpretation and distribution of information (ISR)* where Harris reasoned that insufficient use was being made of data
- *Logistics and sustainability*, as industry could react extremely quickly, once governments had defined requirements

As examples of the latter, Harris described the efforts being undertaken by industry - in partnership with governments - to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Industry had shown it could quickly deploy resources and the same was true in the area of UAVs - another information-based area. Harris added that the US industry was ahead of its EU counterparts in its ability to meet requirements for products and services in a timely fashion. These services could include sustaining the post-conflict situation, as Harris believed that the private sector could play such a role once the military had provided the correct security environment.

“If the military can provide the correct security environment, the private sector can take over the need for sustainability.”

Scott Harris




Harris had expected a culture of collective capability to emerge based on meeting these new security requirements. However, he had seen no sign of this, as there were still too many national programmes and national procurement initiatives. In short, there was too much fragmentation and no common industry response. Old habits were hard to break.

After hearing from industry, moderator **Ronald Asmus**, Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the US, asked the members of the panel - on the political side of the fence - what Riga

could bring to the party. Would we be seeing more convergence of the transatlantic views?

Looking ahead to Riga, Latvia's State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, **Edgars Rinkevics** placed operations, capabilities, partnerships and




Partnerships make a world of difference.

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enlargement at the top of the agenda. He did agree with Naumann that NATO would eventually need to redraft its strategic concept but that was not for Riga. Afghanistan was currently the major priority and after five years, it was obvious that a more comprehensive approach was required.

Rinkevics saw many actors – the EU, NATO, NGOs and humanitarian institutions for example – but he saw little evidence of a coordinated approach. There had been many disagreements in the EU-NATO relationship - surprising given that many Member States were members of both organisations. As for Riga itself, Rinkevics saw advances in NATO's capabilities, as everyone was looking forward to strategic airlift, the arrival of AGS and the operational status of the NRF. In addition, the approval of the CPG would be a boost for the Alliance.

He also added that Afghanistan had shown the need for partnerships with countries that would

“Afghanistan is a litmus test for NATO’s future.”
Edgars Rinkevics

want a closer relationship with NATO without seeking full membership. Rinkevics also hoped for a boost for enlargement – stopping short of decision-making – that would include

a positive message for countries in the Membership Action Plan and perhaps for countries such as Ukraine and Georgia.

The US Mission to NATO's Political Advisor **Stuart Seldowitz** saw himself agreeing with almost everything that Naumann had said, but he wanted to bring a US perspective to the debate. Seldowitz had three points:

- 1) The US view of Europe. He did not want to over-simplify the situation; it was not a dialogue between the US and the EU, but rather between 26 individual allies all with differing viewpoints.
- 2) Such differences were natural. Seldowitz saw these as differences of detail rather than

as fundamental clashes of principle. NATO had often seen such divergent views in its history (Suez, Vietnam, etc.) and they were really national differences that happened to be played out in the NATO arena.

- 3) Agreement on the fundamentals. Despite the above, Seldowitz saw widespread agreement in a number of areas. These included:
 - a. NATO's importance to the transatlantic relationship
 - b. The importance of success in Afghanistan to collective security
 - c. The need for the EU and NATO to work in a complementary manner
 - d. NATO and the EU can only deploy jointly in a military arena via the Alliance
 - e. Europe cannot act alone without access to US military capabilities
 - f. NATO has a role to play in the political dialogue between the US and Europe

Eckart von Klaeden, the Speaker for Foreign Policy of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag, looked to the post-Riga situation. With the need to plan for the proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, energy security, the rise of China, the establishment of a new world order, climate change and the impact of demographics –



von Klaeden was not convinced that there was a commonality of approach and analysis of the various threats.

Globalisation had brought increased complexities and von Klaeden saw the need for not just enlargement but also a deepening of the Alliance. He did not think that NATO was ready to deal with biological attacks, for example, as the exercises that had typically been carried out in the Cold War period were no longer on the agenda. Moving to “effective multilateralism”, the US approach might have changed, but von Klaeden wanted Europe to be more efficient. Agreeing with Naumann

on the subject of national caveats, von Klaeden said that it was not possible to have a transatlantic alliance where the US was left to conduct all the difficult military operations while the Europeans were left with the soft options.

“There is a consensus that Europe cannot act alone without access to US military capabilities.”
Stuart Seldowitz

Caveats undermined solidarity and he noted that there were also non-military caveats, such as the treatment of prisoners of war that also brought divisions. Both had to be overcome if there was to be a true meeting of minds.

The third session debate

The EU and the US's views on NATO - converging or not?

Neither **Edgar Buckley** nor **Brooks Tigner** were convinced that the US and the EU were seeing eye-to-eye on NATO. Buckley did not see NATO as the only option for EU-US cooperation, while Tigner was not convinced that opposition of some EU Member States to the US presence in Iraq had entirely vanished. He was especially keen to hear what the German position was in relation to transatlantic relations.

Naumann referred Tigner to Germany's White Paper on defence. It was crystal clear in its view that NATO was the "number one choice" over the EU. Von Klaeden agreed, adding that experience had shown that the idea of using the EU as a counterweight to the US had proved to be divisive. Germany now wanted France to be more constructive within NATO and the UK to be more constructive in the EU. And the two organisations – NATO and the EU – had to be more complementary. This prompted **Tomas Valášek** to ask what the forthcoming German Presidency of the EU would do to correct these fault lines. No answer was forthcoming, as von Klaeden argued that it was not possible to change the situation ahead of the French elections and the planned change of UK leadership.

While agreeing that the US could probably do more, **Julianne Smith** wanted the Europeans to reconcile their differences – she would have liked to hear the views of the southern countries and France as that might have led to a more rigorous debate. Asmus took this as a cue to ask if Europe was being passive or active. Was it merely waiting to see what the US would do? And would Germany be taking a more active role in shaping policy in NATO? **Bühl** also referred Asmus to the White Paper – it had committed itself fully to the transatlantic community – and von Klaeden said that Germany was becoming more active, as could be shown by its involvement in the recent Lebanon crisis.

Technology transfer

Paulo Brito introduced the issue of technology transfer. Despite NATO working on AGS and IEDs, it was still clear that many European countries were defending their own interests. Brito saw European resources being pushed to the US while there was hardly any evidence of technology being transferred to Europe across the Atlantic. **Naumann** was clear. He wanted the Europeans to abandon the "flawed interpretation" of technology transfer, whereby they would receive US products free of charge. It was obvious that Europe must at least contribute to R&D or give the US something in exchange. On the other hand, the US had to do more in terms of purchasing the best European products.

US foreign policy and NATO

Paulo Brito had heard the Danish Foreign Minister praising NATO, and in a similar vein, asked if NATO was the cornerstone of the



NATO's spokesman with the Danish delegation



US's foreign policy. Absolutely not, responded **Seldowitz**. With due respect to Europe, the US had much broader demands in its foreign policy. So NATO would not be a global policeman and it would not be intervening in places like Korea.

NATO's future

Asmus reminded the audience that back in 1999, the US had asked the question – does NATO go beyond Europe? – and the Europeans had said no! After 9/11, the US had missed the opportunity to turn NATO in a global player. Naumann confirmed that the German government had been ready to commit its forces on combat missions in Afghanistan.

Now, Asmus argued, even the most ardent Atlanticist saw a global NATO that had limits: it would be considered successful if it would operate up to Europe's periphery, in the Middle East (in an arc through North Africa to Afghanistan) and not in Asia – where partners would be the preferred option. Although Asmus saw that as the future, he did not see that type of agreement being reached at Riga. He looked ahead to 2008, where the US would probably be more willing to hold a dialogue with the EU and there might be more solutions for solving the EU-NATO problems.

Naumann agreed with Asmus about that possible future and he encouraged the US not to give up on NATO or on consulting with the allies on subjects outside of the NATO arena. He wanted the US to consult with its European allies before taking decision, especially as it was now accepted that problems were global in nature.

Towards a two-tier alliance

Following up on the convergence of US and EU view, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's **Jonah Peppiatt** asked if the panel thought there would be any change in national caveats in the next six months. Von Klaeden thought that was unlikely as they were decided by national parliaments and he couldn't see the German Parliament delivering a better result than the current one. Rinkevics reasoned that von Klaeden was speaking for many; it was extremely difficult to remove such caveats. **Paul Flaherty** from the UK Delegation to NATO heard the debate and concluded that if caveats were not removed, he could foresee members "sleepwalking towards a two-tier alliance".

Defence spending in Europe

Defence spending was a concern for **Uraz**. With only a few allies spending more than 2% GDP, was this an obstacle for NATO and the EU? Harris paraphrased the words of the EDA's Nick Witney, saying that European Member States spent a lot of money on defence but they did not spend it efficiently. Harris could see two solutions, both of which involved taking political decisions:

- 1) Spend more effectively: as the level of expenditure would not rise in the present environment, there had to be reform
- 2) Spend more: as that was the only way to get more

Both Rinkevics and von Klaeden agreed that 2% of GDP was insufficient in terms of defence spending. However, while von Klaeden thought

that this was just an example of many budgets being under-funded, foreign policy was another issue, Rinkevics argued that even this level would be hard to justify unless there was a clear understanding and acceptance of what the money would be used for. There had to be a clear programme to justify modernisation.

The Estonian Delegation to NATO's

Lauri Lepik wanted to know if the panel had any thoughts about the EU's decision to open up the EU's defence industry. Harris commented that the initiatives from the Commission and the EDA were seen positively in Europe. However, the US' opinion was that while these acts could lead to a more competitive European market, it would also be more closed to outsiders. He argued that this would not only be bad for transatlantic relations but also for European industry as the market was not large enough to sustain itself without external players. Bühl added that the European market needed projects that were of interest to the US, the EU and NATO. That was the main requirement, and he asked the US to be patient with the Europeans – it needed at least another decade to recover from the events following the end of the Cold War.

NATO's image


Returning to Valášek's comments on security providers and consumers, Pakistan's

Ambassador Saeed Khalid added the role of the security facilitators. That was the role of Pakistan in the ongoing Afghanistan mission, where it had contributed 80,000 troops and suffered over 500 casualties. The Ambassador added that with NATO saying its mission would continue, the Taliban was describing the

Alliance as an occupational force. That was the reason for his earlier remarks about the UN's role, as it was not generally accepted that NATO was in Afghanistan to provide security to the people of the region. In addition, the Ambassador wanted a political solution to the problem, as military means would never be enough.

Von Klaeden accepted that any solution had to be political but he wanted the Pakistan government to do more to support the creation of the right environment in which such a solution might flourish. Rinkevics agreed, adding that this was the reason why more cooperation was needed with international organisations. Afghanistan was a litmus test for NATO's future and coordination was vital. However, he had seen insufficient evidence of it amongst the various international organisations at this time. ■

NATO AGS - EYES IN THE SKY



Having a complete, timely and accurate ground surveillance picture is crucial for assuring the peace throughout the world.

To face the threats of the 21st Century, NATO forces need a system that provides them with a complete picture of the situation on the ground with wide area, all-weather 24 hours surveillance.

Industry of both sides of the Atlantic is providing NATO with an AGS capability that will support the large variety of military and civil-military missions, such as

- **Crisis Management**
Peace-keeping
Peace-enforcing
- **Humanitarian Missions**
Search & Rescue
Disaster Relief
- **Stabilisation**
Demilitarisation
Force Protection
Nation Building Activities
- **Security**
Border Surveillance
Infrastructure Protection
- **Defence against Terrorism**

The NATO AGS mixed fleet of manned and unmanned assets will be a critical enabler for the NATO's Response Force (NRF) and a key building block for NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) Operations. It will also ensure interoperability within the EU Battle-Groups as well as with national and NATO assets. Thus the Alliance and Europe are getting more than just airborne ground surveillance. They are getting eyes in the sky not only for their own joint transatlantic security and defence but also for the security in the world.



Transforming NATO (...again)

CSIS Executive Summary

NATO's 26 members will meet in Riga, Latvia this November for what some are calling the "introverted" summit. NATO summits are often used to launch major initiatives or welcome new members into the fold. The Riga Summit, however, will break from that tradition and allow NATO allies to take stock of the Alliance's ongoing political and military transformation while focusing on the current mission in Afghanistan. A handful of small but important capability initiatives will be launched, including the acquisition of common assets and a new program for special operation forces. Deep political divisions, however, will prevent the Alliance from making comparable progress on its overarching strategic direction. If NATO wants to advance its transformation agenda, however, it will need to resolve fundamental questions about its future roles and missions. Major developments concerning enlargement, partnerships, training, capabilities, and coordination with other organizations will only be possible when NATO allies reach consensus on the Alliance's purpose in today's complex security environment.

Political Transformation

The term transformation is often associated with efforts to prepare forces for new missions – in NATO's case, expeditionary operations. While NATO will use its Riga Summit to launch and strengthen a number of capability initiatives aimed at preparing its forces for future missions, it will also focus on the Alliance's

ongoing political transformation. Initially, the Riga Summit was slated to unveil a list of ambitious political reforms tied to NATO Headquarters. It now appears Riga will focus on three core areas: endorsing the Comprehensive Political Guidance, committing NATO to future rounds of enlargement, and committing the Alliance to building and strengthening global partnerships (along with a possible tasking to look into the feasibility of creating a new training initiative). While the value of these initiatives should not be underestimated, NATO will need to return to its original, more ambitious list of reforms in preparation for its next summit if it wants to preserve its viability as an effective and relevant alliance.

Comprehensive Political Guidance

At the center of Riga's political agenda sits the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which will be endorsed by Heads of State and Government in November. This document aims to outline a framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, but it fails to provide NATO members with the guidance they need to meet future challenges. As a result, NATO should aim to rewrite its Strategic Concept for its 60th anniversary summit in 2009.

NATO Enlargement and Partnerships

Since 1999, NATO summits have always included announcements or initiatives tied to enlargement. In that regard, the Riga Summit will likely be different. Political and popular skepticism about the value of further enlargement, the slow pace of reforms, and

deteriorating security situations have damaged various aspirants' cases, as has a general "absorption fatigue" among current NATO members. NATO will be careful not to close any doors but the possibility of issuing invitations even to the Adriatic Charter nations (certainly the most favored for membership at the moment) seems to have dissipated. Before its next summit in 2008, NATO should foster real debate about universal membership standards and goals while maintaining its Open Door Policy.

Regarding partnerships, all NATO members recognize the enormous contributions that non-NATO allies have made to alliance operations in recent years. The presence of Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese soldiers in Afghanistan is one positive example of such cooperation. What NATO cannot seem to agree on is the best way to reward and further strengthen the Allies' relationship with these and other like-minded countries. In Riga, NATO communiqués will likely stress the importance of expanding cooperation with partner countries without committing NATO or the partner countries to any concrete initiative. In the next two years, NATO should undertake a full audit of existing partnership programs, ensure that all players understand the fundamental objectives, and seek to improve coordination among various partnership programs. NATO should not risk diluting the much-desired label of "NATO partner" with partnerships that are heavy on rhetoric and short on substance.

Military Transformation

Despite NATO's ongoing struggle to reach consensus on its role in today's global security

environment, the Alliance has succeeded in launching a number of new capability initiatives over the last 10 to 15 years. The Riga Summit will continue that tradition by formally declaring the NATO Response Force (NRF) operational, announcing two much-needed common asset programs, launching a new program for special operations forces, and tasking the Alliance to further investigate ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation among NATO members. It is possible that the summit will also suggest that NATO consider developing special capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Like any effort tied to military capabilities, however, the challenge will come in turning many of these paper promises into concrete action. In the past, NATO members have made a number of rhetorical commitments that they then have failed to meet. Therefore, in the years ahead, NATO will need to identify innovative ways for members to bridge the gap between ambition and capabilities. Some of the best ways to do so include addressing funding approaches (e.g., "costs lie where they fall") that disincentivize participation, resolving NATO's broader strategic debate about why such capabilities are required and helping members identify ways to spend what limited resources they have more wisely.

Current Operations

Beyond transformation, the Riga Summit will focus heavily on NATO's current operations. First and foremost, NATO's ongoing mission in Afghanistan will serve as an indicator of the Alliance's viability and effectiveness in tackling 21st century challenges. NATO members will

need to determine whether or not they have the political will to commit the capabilities the mission requires. Kosovo and Darfur may also appear in the final summit documents, although it is doubtful that any new developments regarding these two missions will be unveiled.

Afghanistan

The future of NATO ultimately hangs on a successful mission in Afghanistan. Consequently, the most essential question to address at the Riga Summit is whether or not NATO can muster the will and capabilities to stay the course. A positive outcome for the Alliance would be revitalized unity and tangible improvement in resources, interoperability, and civil-military cooperation on the ground in Afghanistan.

The Alliance should use the Riga Summit to reaffirm its commitment to International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and show the Afghans that it will commit the necessary capabilities and resources to succeed. After the Summit, NATO allies will need to define ISAF's role in security sector reform and agree on how to balance reconstruction and security objectives. NATO also needs to resolve the poppy eradication debate. While Afghanistan's future is tied to its ability to eliminate drug production, NATO's role in these efforts should be limited. NATO allies should, however, investigate ways other instruments and organizations can help Afghanistan with this complex and long-term challenge.

Kosovo

When NATO leaders gather in Riga, they will inevitably discuss the future of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR). Kosovo is at a critical juncture. A general consensus has emerged that the

status quo is untenable because the political ambiguity is fostering crime, corruption, radicalism, emigration, and a weakening of Kosovo's institutions. Consequently, NATO should use the Riga Summit to reaffirm its commitment to Kosovo while recognizing that the nature of the conflict has changed. Security threats increasingly have intrastate rather than interstate origins. Therefore, future peacekeeping and peace building functions will have to focus on issues of sustainable development, governance, and rebuilding institutions. While it is unlikely the Riga Summit will produce meaningful new initiatives on Kosovo, it should nonetheless be a first step in mapping out NATO's future posture in the event of an independent Kosovo.

The Next NATO Summit

Just as compelling as what is on the agenda at NATO's Riga Summit will be what is left off. The EU-NATO relationship, for example, will not feature prominently in any of the Summit proceedings, partly because the tensions surrounding that relationship remain so high and neither the EU nor NATO appears to have fresh ideas for how to address them. Similarly, and almost ironically, many of the toughest issues associated with NATO's military transformation – Allied Command Transformation, transformation concepts, and defense planning – will also be left off the Summit agenda. Finally, because non-NATO members were not invited to this summit, the NATO-Russia relationship will not play a major role in Riga. All of these issues, however, have the potential to significantly shape NATO's future success. As such, NATO should make

these three areas the centerpiece of its next summit agenda in 2008 or 2009.

NATO-EU Relations

Most members of these two organizations agree that the relationship is plagued by mistrust, unhealthy competition, and information sharing problems, but neither NATO nor the EU has stepped forward to solve the problems. Given the long list of competing priorities inside each organization and the deep political differences among members on whether and how to strengthen EU-NATO ties, a degree of stalemate is understandable. In the long term, however, neither organization can afford inaction or inattention. With 19 nations in a congruent geopolitical space that share multiple common interests and challenges, EU-NATO cooperation is both unavoidable and essential.

In the short term, major changes to the EU-NATO relationship will be difficult. However, a number of pragmatic, small-scale initiatives could be launched in the next year, including enhanced cooperation between NATO and the European Defense Agency; monthly meetings between the NATO Secretary General and his EU counterpart, Javier Solana, to coordinate policies on pressing issues such as counterterrorism and reconstruction operations; and a joint working group to examine the consequences and benefits of defense integration (i.e., pooling, specialization, or multinational procurement).

Transforming for Tomorrow

The Riga Summit is being billed as a "transformation summit" at a time when NATO's fledgling agent for change, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), is clearly experiencing

difficulties implementing its vision within the Alliance. This seems largely due to the harsh realities of NATO's current operational environment. The Alliance is struggling to meet the political, operational, and financial challenges of operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Under such conditions, many allies wonder if it is prudent to divert scarce political and financial resources to experiment with novel technologies and operational concepts. The concerns are understandable, but the hard truth remains that transformation is an existential imperative. If NATO does not succeed in creating a culture of ongoing transformation and the capabilities it needs to meet 21st century challenges, it will go out of business.

Russia

Russia was not invited to Riga, and as a result, the NATO-Russia relationship will not feature prominently on the summit agenda. Russia will, however, be a factor in many of the questions and deliberations at the summit. Although few would call Russia a 21st century superpower, it still possesses a large nuclear arsenal and has great influence in world politics on multiple fronts. Cooperation with Russia should therefore be of great importance to NATO. To underline the importance of cooperation, the Alliance should make 2007 a special "Russia year" by celebrating the fifth anniversary of the NATO-Russia Council or the tenth anniversary of the Founding Act. ■

Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch?

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General's Speech at the SDA Conference.
Brussels, 6 November 2006

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Good morning. It's great to be back at the SDA. "Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch", that's an interesting combination of words – another Gilles Merritt classic! It is obviously intended to provoke – and, I admit, it works. So let me focus on the theme of the conference, and offer you my views on both the terms "global" and "overstretch".

I have said it on many occasions, and I will say it again here today: we don't need a global NATO. That is not what our transformation is all about. The kind of NATO that we need – and that we are successfully creating – is an Alliance that defends its members against global threats: terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and failed states. To counter these threats, NATO doesn't need to become a "gendarme du monde". What we need is an increasingly global approach to security, with organisations, including NATO, playing their respective roles.

But doesn't such a demanding job description invite the danger of "overstretch", as the conference theme implies. Is the need for NATO to defend against global threats an invitation to get entangled in ever more demanding engagements, yet with limited means?

Clearly, coping with an ever increasing set of demands will remain a constant chal-

lenge. Right now, more than 50,000 soldiers are serving under NATO command in operations and missions on three continents. We have never seen our resources stretched like this before. And since the demand for NATO will not diminish, but certainly grow further, we must make sure the Alliance is able to deliver. And I believe that means we should concentrate on six key areas.

Number one, we need to continue to build up our capabilities.

At our Riga Summit in three weeks' time, we will bring together key strands of NATO's work in that area, including missile defence, air-to-ground surveillance, terrorism-related work, and defence against weapons of mass destruction. [13 NATO-nations and one partner will sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the collective use of C-17 strategic transport aircraft.] And the NATO Response Force should reach its Full Operational Capability.

This demonstrates the tremendous progress we have already achieved. But I believe that even more needs to be done beyond Riga. We also need a much clearer NATO framework for training and employing Special Forces. That's why the Riga Summit will not be an end point, but merely a stepping stone in our continuing military transformation process.

the entire speech can be found on SDA's website:
www.securitydefenceagenda.org



Radio Netherlands interviews Pakistan Ambassador to EU Saad Khalid

Press Coverage - a selection



"NATO chief steps up call for greater EU role in Afghanistan "

International Herald Tribune



"NATO Chief Calls for Common Funding for More Alliance Operations"

DefenceNews.com



"NATO chief urges end to "beauty contest" with EU"

Reuters



"Afghan unrest fuels tensions ahead of NATO summit"

AFP.com



"NATO Chief Warns Against EU-NATO Rivalry"

RadioFreeEurope / RadioLiberty



"NATO chief tells EU not to 'replicate' army tasks"

euobserver.com



"M. de Hoop Scheffer suggère que l'UE forme les policiers afghans"

Belga



"Polish President Kaczynski's proposal for EU standing army raises concerns over "replication"

Interfax

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1. Thirteen NATO-nations and one partner will sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the collective use of C-17 strategic transport aircraft.
2. At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders directed the North Atlantic Council to prepare for their consideration Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). While remaining consistent with the Strategic Concept, the CPG will take into account the changes in the security environment that have taken place since 1999. (<http://www.nato.int/>)
3. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty).
4. A terabyte is a term for data storage capacity equal to 1024 gigabytes, i.e. one trillion bytes.
5. Given NATO's experience and expertise in providing security- and defence-related training, the US, Norway and Italy have proposed that the Alliance launch a new training initiative in the Middle East. The proposal is that a centre would train 100-200 Middle Eastern defence personnel annually in such subjects as civil-military relations, defence planning and budgeting.
6. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. (Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty).
7. On 25 June 1992, the Heads of State and Government of eleven countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed in Istanbul the Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). With the accession of Serbia and Montenegro in April 2004, the Organization's Member States increased to 12.
8. An Individual Cooperation Program (ICP) agreement was concluded on October 16, 2006. It created a formal framework for cooperation between Israel and the alliance in 27 areas, including intelligence sharing, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) defense and civilian emergency preparedness. (see <http://www.jpost.com/>).
9. NATO is buying an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that will give commanders a picture of the situation on the ground in an area of interest. It will consist of a mix of manned and unmanned airborne radar platforms that can look down on the ground and relay data to commanders, providing them with 'eyes in the sky' over a specific area. The AGS will be produced by the AGS Industries, a transatlantic joint venture company (EADS, Galileo Avionica, General Dynamics Canada, Indra, Northrop Grumman and Thales) with the goal of having an initial operational capability in 2013. It will be owned and operated by NATO. (<http://www.ags-i.com/>)

About the SDA

The Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) is the leading Brussels-based security and defence think tank where EU institutions, NATO, national government representatives, parliamentarians, industry, specialised and international media, think tanks, academia and NGOs gather regularly to discuss the future of security and defence policies.

The aim of the SDA is to raise awareness of how EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and how global challenges such as terrorism, regional conflicts and weapons of mass destruction can be met.

The SDA's activities span monthly roundtables, reports and discussion papers, international conferences and press dinners.



THE SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA WOULD LIKE TO THANK ITS PARTNERS AND MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT IN MAKING THE SDA A SUCCESS



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SDA would like to thank NATO
for its support for this conference



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